

MEMORANDUM FOR:

I understand OCI people have been in touch informally with and know what his proposal entails.

Is the next step to take Blake up on his briefing, with OCI represented?

a NIO rep.

yes.

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@ 300
DDI conf
room.*

Date 20 November 1975

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20 November 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT : Special Printing Plant
REFERENCE : Memo from DDA to DDI, same subject, dated
7 November 1975 (DDI-2963-75)

Summary

We oppose the proposal to eliminate the Special Printing Plant.

We base our position on these considerations:

-- The President's Daily Brief, the National Intelligence Daily, the National Intelligence Bulletin, and the Intelligence Checklist are the most important current intelligence publications that the Agency produces. Their production in the most efficient and timely manner is clearly one of the Agency's most important priorities.

Each of the publications should be as current as possible. We attempt to make the President's Daily Brief and National Intelligence Daily up-to-date as of two hours before delivery to the President and other high government officials. The present location of the Special Printing Plant in Room 7G28 contributes significantly to our ability to do this. Moving printing and photography services to the General Printing Plant in Room GJ56 would among other things force deadlines ahead by at least an hour. We estimate that updating has been required in our publications during this hour at least once or twice a week.

-- The proximity of the editorial, composition, photography, and printing components also contributes significantly to the quality of the publications. The frequent consultations that occur between printers and others are critical to quality

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control. Editors and processors make 20 to 25 trips to and from the Special Printing Plant each night. To move the printing and photography services away would decrease the consultations and increase the probability of error.

-- A requirement to carry sensitive intelligence materials from the seventh floor to the ground floor for printing and photography, and to carry the sensitive completed materials back to the seventh floor for packaging and dissemination, would create security problems not now involved in the publications program.

The Argument

Almost two years of keeping major intelligence production components close to each other have shown that the arrangement is central to our ability to turn out overnight publications successfully and efficiently. To move any of these components away from the others would damage the overnight publications operation.

The Office of Current Intelligence, the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Printing and Photography Division all have people and equipment grouped in the seventh floor area at night for a joint effort. The analysts, editors, publication typists, proof-readers, and paste-up men are in Room 7G50 because they are close to Room 7G28, where the Special Printing Plant provides the printing and photography services required to get out the publications. The Special Printing Plant is just across the hall from Room 7G15, Registry, where the hot-off-the-press publications are packaged and sent out to important consumers.

This arrangement works. The parts are finely tuned. Publications deadlines occur one after another through the night so that each publication--the National Intelligence Bulletin, the National Intelligence Daily, the Intelligence Checklist and the President's Daily Brief--is as up-to-date as possible and gets to its readers on time. If delays occur in one publication, the next publication can be set back and so on down the line.

The Special Printing Plant is involved in many steps of production. Editors and processors make 20 to 25 trips a night to the Special Printing Plant. Here are some of the things they do in connection with the National Intelligence Daily:

They deliver photographs for the photo-mechanical transfer process, pick up the completed transfers for paste-up, discuss the proper degree of photo reduction or contrast, deliver map plates, change map plates previously delivered, deliver the camera-ready Page 2-3 paste-up, revise the Page 2-3 paste-up to accommodate a late change or to correct a late-appearing typographical error, deliver the camera-ready Page 1-4 paste-up of the Daily, revise the Page 1-4 layout at the last moment, and check the newspaper as it comes off the press.

Here are some of the things editors and processors do in connection with the President's Daily Brief, the National Intelligence Bulletin, and the Intelligence Checklist:

They check the printing impressions as each color goes on the maps, correct errors on the map plates or change the plates to reflect new information, deliver camera-ready text pages, revise pages at the last moment to incorporate last changes, submit pages on a piecemeal basis when part of the book is ready and part is not, check the pages as they come off the press, and check the collation of each book.

Through the night, a printer with a question now finds it convenient to take a few steps to the editorial offices to get an answer. He might not take a seven-floor trip to ask a simple but important question.

As each printing deadline approaches, the Registry couriers can monitor progress in the Special Printing Plant. If the deadline for the early downtown delivery is approaching, the couriers can take what they have in hand and deliver the remainder in a later run.

The proximity of working areas keeps the lines of communication open. Each component knows what the other is doing. People have no tortuous channels to snake through, no incomprehensible memoranda to interpret, no telephone conversations, no great distances to traverse. The work gets done, on time.

In the present arrangement, we can produce an item for the President's Daily Brief and the Daily as late as 5:00 a.m., and do so frequently. Often, the President's Daily Brief and the Daily include items that do not appear in The Washington Post simply because of our late deadline. We estimate that if the work now done in the Special Printing Plant were done in the General Printing Plant, the President's Daily Brief and the National Intelligence Daily would lose as much as an hour's currency at the crucial time in the production process--between 4:30 and 5:30 a.m.--because of the need to deal at long range with the print shop. Deadlines would have to allow for the extra time required to carry materials from the seventh floor to the ground floor and back to the seventh floor. We would lose efficiency throughout the night, and the cost would be highest just when time becomes most precious.

Our proximity to the Special Printing Plant makes it easier to deal with errors that sometimes surface at the last minute, such as missing graphics, errors in the graphics or texts, problems with headlines in the Daily, classification problems and off-center printing. On occasion, the President's or Vice President's copy of the President's Daily Brief has been badly smudged. A ground floor printing plant could correct any of these errors, but again it is a question of time against tight deadlines. We should avoid as often as we can a situation where an editor has to decide whether correcting an error is worth a publication being late.

Security

The page layouts for the National Intelligence Daily must be handled carefully from the beginning of the layout process to the end. These paste-ups consist of separate pieces of paper and film mounted on a layout sheet. Between

the layout sheet and the paper or film is a coating of wax. The wax has to be thick enough to make the piece of paper or film stick to the layout sheet, but not so thick that it will appear as a glob when the layout is photographed to produce the press plate. Furthermore, the wax has to be thin enough to allow the paste-up man to relocate the piece of paper in the event of a make-up change.


Any of these pieces of paper or film can fall off the layout sheet as the compositor carries it to the printers. This has happened. With the paste-up room close to the Special Printing Plant, it has always been possible to find the missing piece. If the compositor had to carry the camera-ready layout all the way to the elevator, down the elevator, and along the ground floor hallway to the General Printing Plant, the danger of losing material would increase. We believe this would constitute a significantly increased security hazard.

Conclusion

In 1973, a proposal to eliminate the Special Printing Plant was introduced, thoroughly debated, and turned down. One of the memoranda circulated in the debate made these points:

"When we moved into Headquarters Building, the seventh floor printing plant, the OCI Registry, the OCI Production Staff, the grandfather of the Operations Center, and the Office of the DOCI were placed as close to one another as was feasible on the seventh floor, because it was recognized that these units formed an integrated complex. The complex in turn was placed on the seventh floor to facilitate support of the DCI and the DDI. The production process is both more complicated and more extensive than it was in 1961, and the arguments for keeping these elements together are even stronger today than they were then."

In 1975, the arguments for keeping these elements together are even stronger than they were in 1973, assuming that the DCI wishes to have publications of the highest possible quality in terms of currency and appearance. Almost any system or location can be made to work if the DCI is willing to sacrifice these qualities. The real issue is what quality he wants; we think he, and the President and our other high-level customers, should get the best.


William K. Parmenter
Director of Current Intelligence

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Attachment:
Reference